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Journal: Philosophy of AI

We are responsible for the journal Philosophy of AI, which is published by the Society for the Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence and founded by PAIR members and associate members.

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Forthcoming/under contract

• Lundgren, B. (forthcoming). No value alignment without control. AI and Ethics.
• Lundgren, B. & Nuñez Hernández, Nancy Abigail. Forthcoming. Is automated therapy dignified Philosophy of AI.
• Müller, V. C. (forthcoming). ‘Deep opacity undermines data protection and explainable artificial intelligence’, in M. Hähnel and R. Müller (eds.), Handbook for Applied Philosophy of AI (London: Wiley).
• Müller, V. C. (forthcoming). ‘Ethics of artificial intelligence and robotics’, in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2025.
• Müller, V. C. (under contract). Can machines think? Fundamental problems of artificial intelligence (New York: Oxford University Press).
• Müller, V. C. (ed.), (under contract). Oxford handbook of the philosophy of artificial intelligence (New York: Oxford University Press)
• Müller, V. C., Dewey, A. R., Dung, L., & Löhr, G. (eds.) (forthcoming). Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence: The State of the Art (Synthese Library, Berlin: SpringerNature).
• Müller, V. C. & Löhr, G. (forthcoming). Artificial minds, (Cambridge Elements – Philosophy of Mind, ed. Keith Frankish; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
• Robertson, I. (under contract). AI and Expertise. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Robertson, I. & Gallagher, S. (under contract) Enactivist Approaches to Cognition. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
• Kind, A., Fink, S. B., & Walter, H.(forthcoming). What is Precision Psychotherapy? Journal of Medicine & Philosophy.
• Fink, S. B. (forthcoming). Structuralism and Neural Correlates of Consciousness. In: Olcese, U., Melloni, L. (eds): The Neuroscience of Consciousness. Springer.
• Fink, S. B. and Schmidt, T. T. (forthcoming) Altered States of Consciousness.In: Klein, C. (ed.): The Open Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. MIT Press.
• Fink, S. B. (forthcoming). Sensory Engineering and Epistemic Risks. Philosophy.

2026

• Jaja, I.R. (2026). Artificially Generated Minorities (AGMs): The Veneer of Algorithmic Bias Correction. In: Gerber, A., Pillay, A.W. (eds): Southern African Conference for Artificial Intelligence Research (SACAIR 2025). Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 2784. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-11733-5_34
• Naeem, H. (2026). Integration, epistemic responsibility and seamlessness. In: Bernhard Koch & David Winkler (eds): Artificial Intelligence Ethics in Military Medicine and Humanitarian Healthcare. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-11331-3_10
• Anderson, J., Hopster, J., and Lundgren, B. 2026. Defining Socially Disruptive Technologies and Reframing the Ethical Challenges They Pose. Technology in Society. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techsoc.2026.103216.

2025

• Naeem, H. (2025). Teaching skills and intellectual virtues with generative AI. Episteme, 1-18. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2025.10089
• Naeem, H. (2025). AI and the complexity of pain. Philosophy and Technology 38(4), 1-21. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-025-00988-0
• Kirkeby-Hinrup, A., Fink, S.B., & Overgaard, Morten S (2025). The multiple generator hypothesis of consciousness. Neuroscience of Consciousness 2025(1), niaf035. https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niaf035
• Fink, S.B., & Ashby, B (2025). Gastronomy as Sensory Engineering. Gastronomica 25 (3): 69–71. https://doi.org/10.1525/gfc.2025.25.3.69
• Ashby, B. (2025). Let sleeping dogs lie: stereotype completion and the Phenomenology of category recognition. Philosophical Studies. 182(3), 865-890. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02268-7
• Catena, E., Tummolini, L., & Santucci, V. G. (2025). Human autonomy with AI in the loop. Philosophical Psychology, 1–28. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2024.2448217
• de Weerd, C. R., & Dung, L. (2025). How to live in the moment: The methodology and limitations of evolutionary research on consciousness. Cognitive Science 49(3). https://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.70053
• Hellrigel-Holderbaum, M., & Dung, L. (2025). Misalignment or misuse? The AGI alignment tradeoff. Philosophical Studies. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02403-y
• Lundgren, B. 2025. The Risk of Surveillance Capitalism. Philosophy & Technology 38, 174. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-025-00983-5
• Lundgren, B. 2025. Review of Norbert Paulo and Lando Kirchmair, Moral Dilemmas Involving Self-Driving Cars: How to Regulate Them and Why Your Opinion Matters (New York: Routledge, 2025), x + 90pp, $37.49. Law and Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-025-09549-0
• Lundgren, B. (2025). Teaching Trade-offs in a Digital Ethics Course. Teaching Ethics, 24(2), 257–265. https://doi.org/10.5840/tej202579163
• Lundgren, B. & Stefánsson, H. Orri. (2025). Can the Normic de minimis Expected Utility Theory save the de minimis Principle?. Erkenntnis 90, 1255–1263. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00751-x
• Lundgren, B. (2025). Can Deepfakes Violate an Individual’s Moral Right to Privacy?. Ethical Theory Moral Practice. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-025-10514-y
• Lundgren, B. (2025). How social should AI be? Erkenntnis. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-025-01005-8
• Lundgren, B. On the Limits of the Data Economy: The Case of Autonomous Vehicles. Science and Engineering Ethics 31 (16). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-025-00540-5
• Lundgren, B. and Stefánsson, H. O. (2025). Can the normic de minimis decision theory save the de minimis principle? Erkenntnis. 90, 1255–1263. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00751-x
• Lundgren, B. (2025). God and the Possibility of a Moral Right to Privacy. Sophia. 64, 339–344. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-024-01057-3
• Lundgren, B. (2025). Hobbes’ Ship of Theseus: On the Limits of Surviving a Gradual Replacement of Parts. Theoria. e70013. https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.70013
• Müller, V. C. (2025). ‘Philosophy of AI: A structured overview’, in Nathalie A. Smuha (ed.), Cambridge handbook on the law, ethics and policy of Artificial Intelligence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 40-58.
• Müller, V. C. (2025). ‘Total surveillance – everybody watching everybody else’, in Henning Glaser and Pindar Wong (eds.), Governing the Future: Digitalization, Artificial Intelligence, Dataism (London: CRC Press – Routledge).
• Robertson, I. (2025). A Problem for Autonomous Know-How. Erkenntnis, 90(4), 1683-1691. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-024-00849-w
• Robertson, I. (2025) AI, Trust and Reliability. Philosophy & Technology. 38(3). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-025-00924-2
• Kirchhoff, M., Kiverstein, J. and Robertson, I. (2025): The Literalist Fallacy and the Free Energy Principle: Model-Building, Scientific Realism, and Instrumentalism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 76(3), 000-000. https://doi.org/10.1086/720861

2024

• Repantis, D., Koslowski, M. & Fink, S.B. Ethische Aspekte der Therapie mit Psychedelika. Psychotherapie 69, 115–121 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00278-024-00710-z
• Fink, S.B. (2024). Wahrnehmung. In: Hoffmann-Kolss, V., Rathgeb, N. (eds) Handbuch Philosophie des Geistes. J.B. Metzler, Stuttgart. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-05416-6_34
• Andreotta, A.J., & Lundgren. B. (2024). Automated informed consent. Big Data & Society 11 (4), https://doi.org/10.1177/20539517241289439
• Balg, D., Bolte, L., Burkard, A., Constantin, J., Dung, L., Gottschalk, J., Gregor-Gehrmann, K., Guntermann, I., Schulz, K. (2024). “Ethische Fragen der Künstlichen Intelligenz” (Interview, Paper). Müller, Vincent C. (ed.), Göttingen: Philovernetzt. https://www.philovernetzt.de/ethische-fragen-der-kuenstlichen-intelligenz/
• Caporuscio, C., Fink, S.B. (2024). Epistemic Risk Reduction in Psychedelic-Assisted Therapy. In: Current Topics in Behavioral Neurosciences. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, https://doi.org/10.1007/7854_2024_531
• de Weerd, C. R. (2024). A Credence-based Theory-heavy Approach to Non-human Consciousness. Synthese 203, 5. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04539-6
• Dewey, A. R. (2024). Balancing the evidential scale for the mental unconscious [commentary]. Philosophical Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2024.2316837
• Dewey, A. R. (2024). Anatomy’s role in mechanistic explanations of organism behaviour. Synthese 203, 137. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04534-x
• Dung, L. (2024). Is superintelligence necessarily moral? Analysis 84(4), 730–738. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anae033
• Dung, L. (2024). The argument for near-term human disempowerment through AI. AI & Society. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-024-01930-2
• Dung, L. (2024). Evaluating approaches for reducing catastrophic risks from AI. AI and Ethics. https://doi.org/10.1007/s43681-024-00475-w
• Dung, L. (2024). Understanding artificial agency. The Philosophical Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqae010
• Dung, L. (2024). Preserving the normative significance of sentience. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 31(1–2), 8–30. https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.31.1.008
• Dung, L., & Kersten, L. (2024). Implementing artificial consciousness. Mind & Language 40(1), 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12532
• Fink, S. B. (2024). On Acid Empiricism. In: The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophy and Psychoactive Drug Use (pp. 225-244). Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland.
• Fink, S. B. (2024). How-tests for consciousness and direct neurophenomenal structuralism. Frontiers in Psychology 15. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1352272
• Hutto, D. D., & Robertson, I. (2024). What Comes Naturally?: Relaxed Naturalism’s New Philosophy of Nature. In Naturalism and Its Challenges (pp. 19-35). Routledge. https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781003430568-2/comes-naturally-daniel-hutto-ian-robertson
• Lundgren, B. (2024), There is No Scarcity Problem. Philosophy & Technology 37, 130. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-024-00815-y
• Lundgren, B. (2024). Is a Moral Right to Privacy Limited by Agents’ Lack of Epistemic Control? Logos & Episteme 15(1): 83-87. https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme20241516
• Lundgren, B. (2024). A new standard for accident simulations for self-driving vehicles: Can we use Waymo’s results from accident simulations? AI & Society 39: 669–673. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-022-01495-y
• Lundgren, B. (2024). Undisruptable or stable concepts: Can we design concepts that can avoid conceptual disruption, normative critique, and counterexamples? Ethics and Information Technology 26, 33. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-024-09767-5
• Lundgren, B., & Kudlek, K. (2024). What we owe (to) the present: Normative and practical challenges for strong longtermism. Futures 164, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2024.103471
• Lundgren, B., Catena, E., Robertson, I. Hellrigel-Holderbaum, M., Jaja, I.R., & Dung, L. (2024). On the need for a Global AI ethics. Journal of Global Ethics (RJGE). https://doi.org/10.1080/17449626.2024.2425366
• Müller, V. C. (2024), ‘Philosophie der Künstlichen Intelligenz: Ein strukturierter Überblick’, trans. Matthias Kettner, in Rainer Adolphi, et al. (eds.), Philosophische Digitalisierungsforschung: Verantwortung, Verständigung, Vernunft, Macht (Bielefeld: transcript Verlag), 345-70.
• Müller, V. C. and Hähnel, M.(2024), Was ist, was kann, was soll KI? Ein philosophisches Gespräch (Blaue Reihe; Hamburg: Felix Meiner).
• Porter, Ronald D./Shen, Minquian/Fabrigar, Leandre R./Seaboyer, Anthony (2024): Assessing Influence in Target Audiences that Won’t Say or Don’t Know How Much They Have Been Influenced. In: Éric Ouellet (Ed): Deterrence in the 21st Century: Statecraft in the information environment, University of Calgary Press, 36p.
  https://ucp.manifoldapp.org/read/deterrence-in-the-21st-century/section/097612c2-2005-4d56-b195-f2e418377755#_idParaDest-26
• Repantis, D., Koslowski, M. & Fink, S.B. (2024) Ethische Aspekte der Therapie mit Psychedelika. Psychotherapie 69, 115–121. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00278-024-00710-z
• Robertson, I. G. (2024). In Defence of Radically Enactive Imagination. Thought 11(4). https://doi.org/10.5840/tht202421525
• Seaboyer, Anthony/Jolicoeur, Pierre (2024): L’intelligence artificielle russe comme outil de désinformation et de déception en Ukraine. In: Frédéric Côté et André Simonyi (Ed), Le Canada à l’aune du conflit en Ukraine, Québec. University of Laval Press. Link.
• Seaboyer, Anthony/Jolicoeur, Pierre (2024): The Evolution of China’s Information Exploitation of COVID-19. In: Éric Ouellet (Ed): Deterrence in the 21st Century: Statecraft in the information environment, University of Calgary Press, 28p. Link.

2023

• Dung, L. (2023). Tests of animal consciousness are tests of machine consciousness. Erkenntnis. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00753-9
• Dung, L. (2023). Current cases of AI misalignment and their implications for future risks. Synthese, 202(5), 138. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04367-0
• Dung, L. (2023). How to deal with risks of AI suffering. Inquiry, 1–29. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2023.2238287
• Hopster, J., Brey, P., Klenk, M., Löhr, G., Marchiori, S., Lundgren, B., Scharp, K. (2023). Conceptual Disruption and the Ethics of Technology. In van de Poel, I. et al. (eds.) Ethics of Socially Disruptive Technologies: An Introduction. Open Book Publishers, pp. 141–162.
• Lundgren, B. (2023). Ethical requirements for digital systems for contact tracing in pandemics: a solution to the contextual limits of ethical guidelines. In Macnish, K., Henschke, A. (eds.) The Ethics of Surveillance in Times of Emergency. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 169–185.
• Lundgren, B. (2023). Should we allow for the possibility of unexercised abilities? A new route to rejecting the poss-ability principle. Inquiry. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2023.2250390.
• Lundgren, B. (2023). Is lack of literature engagement a reason for rejecting a paper in philosophy? Res Publica. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-023-09632-0
• Lundgren, B. (2023). Two notes on Axiological Futurism: The importance of disagreement and methodological implications for value theory. Futures 147, 103120. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2023.103120.
• Lundgren, B. (2023). In defense of ethical guidelines. AI & Ethics  3: 1013–1020. https://doi.org/10.1007/s43681-022-00244-7.
• Lundgren, B. (2023). An unrealistic and undesirable alternative to the right to be forgotten. Telecommunications Policy 47(1): 102446. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.telpol.2022.102446.
• Robertson, I. (2023) The unbearable rightness of seeing? Conceptualism, enactivism, and skilled engagement. Synthese 202, 173 . https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04385-y