Publications & Media

A) Academic Publications


We publish the journal Philosophy of AI – editors: Guido Löhr, Vincent C. Müller. Editorial assistant: Eleonora Catena. This is published for the Society for the Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence (also founded by PAIR members)


  • Dewey, A. R. (forthcoming). Anatomy’s role in mechanistic explanations of organism behaviour. Synthese.
  • de Weerd, C. R. (forthcoming). A Credence-based Theory-heavy Approach to Non-human Consciousness. Synthese.
  • Dung, L. (forthcoming). Evaluating approaches for reducing catastrophic risks from AI. AI and Ethics.
  • Dung, L. (forthcoming). Is superintelligence necessarily moral? Analysis.
  • Dung, L. (forthcoming). The argument for near-term human disempowerment through AI. AI & Society.
  • Dung, L., & Balg, D. (forthcoming). Right in the feels: Academic philosophy, disappointed students and the big questions of life. Teaching Philosophy.
  • Kirchhoff, M., Kiverstein, J. and Robertson, I. (forthcoming): The Literalist Fallacy and the Free Energy Principle: Model-Building, Scientific Realism, and Instrumentalism, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 76
  • Müller, V. C., Dewey, A. R., Dung, L., & Löhr, G. (eds.) (forthcoming), Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence: The State of the Art (Synthese Library, Berlin: SpringerNature).
  • Robertson, I. (forthcoming). In Defence of Enactive Imagination. Thought.
  • Robertson, I. (under contract). AI and Expertise. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


  • Dewey, A. R. (2024). Balancing the evidential scale for the mental unconscious [commentary]. Philosophical Psychology.
  • Dung, L. (2024). Understanding artificial agency. The Philosophical Quarterly.
  • Dung, L. (2024). Preserving the normative significance of sentience. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 31(1–2), 8–30.
  • Lundgren, B. (2024). Is a Moral Right to Privacy Limited by Agents’ Lack of Epistemic Control? Logos & Episteme 15(1): 83-87.
  • Lundgren, B. (2024). A new standard for accident simulations for self-driving vehicles: Can we use Waymo’s results from accident simulations? AI & Society39: 669–673.
  • Lundgren, B. (2024). Undisruptable or stable concepts: Can we design concepts that can avoid conceptual disruption, normative critique, and counterexamples? Ethics and Information Technology.
  • Porter, Ronald D./Shen, Minquian/Fabrigar, Leandre R./Seaboyer, Anthony (2024): Assessing Influence in Target Audiences that Won’t Say or Don’t Know How Much They Have Been Influenced. In: Éric Ouellet (Ed): Deterrence in the 21st Century: Statecraft in the information environment, University of Calgary Press, 36p.
  • Repantis, D., Koslowski, M. & Fink, S.B. Ethische Aspekte der Therapie mit Psychedelika. Psychotherapie 69, 115–121 (2024).
  • Seaboyer, Anthony/Jolicoeur, Pierre (2024): L’intelligence artificielle russe comme outil de désinformation et de déception en Ukraine. In: Frédéric Côté et André Simonyi (Ed), Le Canada à l’aune du conflit en Ukraine, Québec. University of Laval Press. Link.
  • Seaboyer, Anthony/Jolicoeur, Pierre (2024): The Evolution of China’s Information Exploitation of COVID-19. In: Éric Ouellet (Ed): Deterrence in the 21st Century: Statecraft in the information environment, University of Calgary Press, 28p. Link.


  • Dung, L. (2023). Tests of animal consciousness are tests of machine consciousness. Erkenntnis.
  • Dung, L. (2023). Current cases of AI misalignment and their implications for future risks. Synthese, 202(5), 138.
  • Dung, L. (2023). How to deal with risks of AI suffering. Inquiry.
  • Hopster, J., Brey, P., Klenk, M., Löhr, G., Marchiori, S., Lundgren, B., Scharp, K. (2023). Conceptual Disruption and the Ethics of Technology. In van de Poel, I. et al. (eds.) Ethics of Socially Disruptive Technologies: An Introduction. Open Book Publishers, pp. 141–162.
  • Lundgren, B. and Stefánsson, H. O. (2023). Can the normic de minimis decision theory save the de minimis principle? Erkenntnis.
  • Lundgren, B. (2023). Ethical requirements for digital systems for contact tracing in pandemics: a solution to the contextual limits of ethical guidelines. In Macnish, K., Henschke, A. (eds.) The Ethics of Surveillance in Times of Emergency. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 169–185.
  • Lundgren, B. (2023). Should we allow for the possibility of unexercised abilities? A new route to rejecting the poss-ability principle. Inquiry.
  • Lundgren, B. (2023). Is lack of literature engagement a reason for rejecting a paper in philosophy? Res Publica.
  • Lundgren, B. (2023). Two notes on Axiological Futurism: The importance of disagreement and methodological implications for value theory. Futures 147, 103120.
  • Lundgren, B. (2023). In defense of ethical guidelines. AI & Ethics  3: 1013–1020.
  • Lundgren, B.(2023). An unrealistic and undesirable alternative to the right to be forgotten. Telecommunications Policy 47(1): 102446.
  • Robertson, I. (2023) The unbearable rightness of seeing? Conceptualism, enactivism, and skilled engagement. Synthese 202, 173 .

B) Media Publications and Reports